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After the communist system collapsed, all post-communist countries faced the difficult challenge of political and economic transition to democracy and modern capitalism. While former Soviet satellites in Central Europe and the Baltic republics managed to carry out this process quickly and at relatively low economic and social cost, and were rewarded with the 2004 EU accession, other countries went through much more difficult and painful transformations, accomplishing less in economic and social terms and paying higher prices than their more advanced neighbors. Among this relatively disadvantaged group the Balkan countries have performed better in terms of economic and political reforms than have the twelve former Soviet republics formally belonging to the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS). GDP evolution in these three groups of countries is presented in figure 1.
Many comparative studies seek to analyze the causes of such differentiated transition outcomes. They refer to differences in starting conditions (the role of the Soviet structural, institutional and cultural legacy), ethnic conflicts, transition strategies adopted at the beginning of transition, domestic politics and many other factors 2 . Most of these address the role of national policy choices and national institutions even if they attempt to group countries according to similar criteria or into regional subgroups.
While skipping the 'classical' discussion on the role of various transition strategies and national factors determining choice of strategy, we would like to concentrate on the role of the international environment in determining this choice. We would like to focus our attention on three particular factors: (i) external anchoring of national reform process; (ii) international trade arrangements and (iii) international financial stability. If we understand the concept of the international public good (IPG) as 'public goods whose benefits reach across borders' (see Kaul, 2002) we will deal in this paper with the role of IPGs in determining transition process outcomes in Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the former USSR. This research agenda is justified by the active involvement of international organizations in policymaking across transition countries.
According to classical definition (Samuelson, 1954) public goods are non-rival (i.e.
consumption by one person does not reduce consumption opportunities for others) and nonexcludable (i.e. nobody can be prevented from consumption). Consequently, 'international
public goods (IPG) can be defined as a good, once provided, that has largely
1 This is the revised and updated version of the paper presented at the Conference on 'International Public Goods for Economic Development' organized by the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs of Harvard University, at Cambridge, Ma on September 7-8, 2005, which was part of the UNIDO project on the same topic. Authors would like to thank participants of this conference for their interesting and critical remarks as well as the participants of the seminar at the Birkbeck College, University of London in August 2005 for their comments on an early draft of this paper. Funding provided by UNIDO through the Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales (ICEI) in Madrid, Spain allowed us to work on this important topic. Our CASE colleagues James Cabot, Vitalij Dorofeyev and Henryk Kalinowski provided an excellent research and editorial assistance, which helped to prepare this paper. However, the authors bear the sole responsibility for the content and quality of this paper as well as for presented opinions and policy recommendations. 2 See, among others, Aslund (1994) ; Aslund (2002) ; Aslund, Boone, and Johnson (1996) ; Balcerowicz (1994) ; Balcerowicz and Gelb (1995) ; de Melo, Denizer and Gelb (1996) ; Dabrowski (1996) ; Fischer, Sahay, and Vegh (1996) ; Havrylyshyn et al. (2000) ; Fischer and Sahay (2001) ; Stiglitz (1999a Stiglitz ( , 1999 ; Dabrowski, Gomulka and Rostowski (2001) ; Mau (2000) ; WEO (2000) ; EBRD (1999; ; World Bank (2002) . (ODI, 2000) . From this theoretical perspective none of the three factors analyzed in our paper can be considered as a pure international public good. These kinds of goods are perhaps better defined as 'club' goods (Buchanan, 1965 and Cornes and Sandler, 1996) . In the case of club goods, members are tempted to maximize their utility by restricting membership, which leads to insufficient supply. This characteristic seems to reflect particularly well the nature of the regional integration block -the European Union -that has chosen to provide mentioned goods to some, but not all, transition economies 3 . In this respect, global institutions were more willing to provide these goods in a more nondiscriminatory fashion. Our discussion will be therefore concentrated on the relative importance of the delivery of regional club vs. global public goods.
global/international (even regional) non-rival and non-excludable benefits. National public goods (NPG), once provided, benefit largely, if not entirely, the residents of the country in question'
Our paper is organized in the following way: Section 2 focuses on the relative role of the EU as a provider of external anchoring of reforms. Section 3 compares the role of the WTO and regional trade initiatives. Section 4 analyzes the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a provider of international financial stability. Section 5 discusses prospects of regional goods delivery in Europe and other geographical regions. Section 6 offers summary of findings.
External anchoring of national reform process
Given the scope and scale of distortions, wide geographical coverage and differentiated initial conditions, transition has provided a new impetus to the study of growth inducing policies. Differentiated results among countries following the recommendations of the Washington Consensus (including macroeconomic stabilization, internal and external liberalization and privatization) surprised observers and pointed to the importance of previously overlooked institutional factors 4
. Ex post this conclusion seems natural, since institutional reforms were at the core of the transition towards democracy and market economy. But institution building processes proved more difficult than expected. Systematic failures in many countries focused attention on the political economy of reforms, incentives and country ownership. This evolution of thinking about factors most crucial to successful transition is represented in figure 2 . This new paradigm is relevant for the discussion of the 3 See the analysis of NATO expansion in the context of club goods theory in Sandler and Hartley (1999). 4 See the brief review of the broader debate on the role of institutions in Rodrik (2004) .
role of IPG. Although most important institutions have a national character and must be created through the domestic political process, transition experience has shown that external factors can play an important role that we define, following Berglof and Roland (1997) , as external anchoring of reforms. The literature on political economy of reform explains why external anchoring might be important or, in other words, why anchoring reforms domestically is not always possible (see Rodrik, 1996 and Fukuyama, 2004 for overview). Dewatripont and Roland (1992) argue that policymakers face two sets of policy constraints. Ex ante political constraints might prevent reforms from being implemented. Not only aggregate but also individual uncertainty about the results of reforms can prove an essential barrier to reforms (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991) . Ex post political constraints deal with the possibility of policy reversal. The two constraints are not always independent; some reforms are not successfully implemented because of the risk of future reversal. Attempts to impose hard budget constraints, for example, or to shed labor by compensating job losers, can fail due to time inconsistency problems. Schleifer et al (1993) and Roland and Verdier (2003) show how multiple equilibria can arise in the transition process due to interactions between incentives to become producers or predators and costs of law enforcement.
External anchoring can have a benevolent role in overcoming these problems foreign aid often discourages reforms (Sachs, 1994; Casella and Eichengreen, 1996) , the role of traditional conditionality is to make sure countries do not delay necessary changes.
Unlike conditionality that is quite often associated with imposing reforms, we define external anchoring as promoting both supply and genuine demand for reforms. Nevertheless, external anchoring requires giving up some aspects of sovereignty and it is rare that any country is willing to do so in respect to any other country, especially a bigger and more powerful neighbor (e.g. Mexico vis-à-vis US). As a result, external anchoring in most cases cannot be provided through bilateral relations but calls for international collective action.
In transition countries, most external anchoring of reforms was provided by two types of actors: regional institutions (the EU and NATO) and global institutions (the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO). The relative influence of regional and global institutions has been different in various countries. For Central Eastern Europe, the Baltics and, increasingly, the Balkans, regional integration has proven essential and very effective in providing external anchoring. In contrast, the CIS countries have depended exclusively on global institutions with much less satisfactory results. In discussion below we focus on the two most important providers of external anchoring: the EU and the IMF 7 .
The role of the EU integration process
Below we describe the external anchoring provided within the European integration process through incentives, conditions and monitoring. Figure 3 presents the main stages of this process.
For the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia -countries that started reforms first and implemented them forcefully and decisively, European integration was the 6 For discussion, see: Easterly (2001) , IMF (2001), Drazen & Isard (2004). 7 In the discussion below, we will not comment on the anchoring role of some other important regional and global organizations. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the most influential and effective regional security organization in the world and, for a number of transition countries, with the dominant strategic goal of 'coming back to the West', joining NATO was equally, if not more, important a stimulus for reforms in the political sphere as was EU accession. WTO has not been important so far in providing external anchoring. For countries participating in the EU integration process, EU institutions and conditionality have overriding character compared with the WTO's more narrow and weaker conditionality (see also Section 3 of this paper). This role has changed, to some extent, in the case of big CIS countries such as Russia, Ukraine or Kazakhstan, now applying to become WTO members. For them some WTO entry requirements -avoiding import discrimination in indirect taxation, adjustment of domestic energy prices, protection of intellectual property rights, opening of financial sector to foreign investors -play a helpful role in determining domestic reform agenda. The World Bank was very active in virtually all transition countries and provided both financial resources and technical advice for reform process. However, its external anchoring impact was smaller than that of the IMF for two reasons. First, WB adjustment lending decisions are usually dependent on getting a prior IMF 'stamp of approval', i.e. satisfying the IMF conditionality. Second, WB adjustment lending offers usually much smaller amounts than IMF loans. The impact of other international organizations like OECD, BIS, UNDP, OSCE, Council of Europe was either marginal or purely sectoral. strategic direction from day one of transition. However, the very first phase of reforms was driven less by specific consideration about accession strategy than by the general enthusiasm about parting with communism, building a 'normal society' and reintegrating with the 'free world'. This period, known as the 'honeymoon' or 'period of extraordinary politics' (Balcerowicz, 1994) , could not last long and the consolidation of reforms required further fuel.
Fortunately, the strong desire to 'come back to the west' (Mizsei, 2004) was welcomed by the European Economic Community (European Union since 1993), which signed comprehensive Europe Association Agreements with these countries in 1991. At this moment, newly associate countries had already managed to build the fundamentals of democracy and free market economy, however sustainability of reforms was still questionable, while the macroeconomic situation was dismal and the prospect for further progress uncertain. What association agreements signaled was a clear commitment to enlargement. This commitment was, however, linked to the conditionality formulated in Copenhagen in 1993. 'Accession will take place as soon as an associated country is able to assume obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions required. Membership requires:
• stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, • the existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union,
• the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.' Agenda 2000, adopted by the EU in Luxembourg in 1997, confirmed the commitment to enlargement, but also showed a strong signal that the EU would not tolerate quick accession of countries lagging in the political, economic and administrative reform process.
In fact it was concluded after a detailed review of each applicant state that none of them NATO process, led to a democratic regime change in Slovakia, which energetically transformed its political scene and accelerated economic reforms. The new reform effort was also taken in remaining four countries, particularly impressing in Bulgaria after a deep financial and political crisis in 1996-1997. Accordingly, the EU enlargement strategy was modified at the summit in Helsinki to reflect the view that, at that moment, a carrot rather than a stick was the more effective tool with which to promote reform (compare quotes in box 2).
Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia were all allowed to start negotiations in 2000 (we refer to these countries in the rest of this paper as the Helsinki group).
Box 2. New Accession Strategy, Helsinki 1999
• 'The risk in taking this 'hard line' approach is that the countries concerned, having already made great efforts and sacrifices, will become disillusioned and turn their backs on us. Their economic policies will begin to diverge, and an historic opportunity will have been lost -perhaps forever'
• 'The time has come to inject new momentum into the enlargement process and give a strong signal of its [the Commission's] determination to bring this process forward as quickly as possible'.
• 'Negotiations should be opened in 2000 with all candidate countries which meet the political criteria for membership and have proved to be ready to take the necessary measures to comply with the economic criteria' But if this carrot proved effective, it was only because the stick was firmly in the hands of the European Commission. Negotiations proved difficult. Annual progress reports prepared by the Commission were often critical, with candidate countries being reminded on many occasions that the opening of negotiations did not necessarily lead to early accessions, and with the European Commission revisiting issues previously believed to have been resolved, according to the principle that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed (see box 3 below). Negotiations allowed the European Commission to effectively monitor the comprehensive process of institutional quality improvements in all major areas of public functions (Roland, 2005) .
Box 3. EU Accession negotiations
• 'The decision to enter into negotiations does not imply that they will be successfully concluded at the same time. Their conclusion and the subsequent accession of the different applicant States will depend on the extent to which each complies with the Copenhagen criteria and on the Union's ability to assimilate new members'
• 'The decision to close chapters provisionally has generally been taken according to the following criteria: full acceptance of the EU acquis, absence of requests for transitional periods, satisfactory answers to EU questions. Moreover, the EU, while accepting provisional closure, has insisted on the global character of the negotiations (nothing is agreed until everything is agreed), as well as on the need for satisfactory progress in the preparations for accession in each of the candidate countries. In this respect the EU side announced that it will monitor progress under each chapter throughout the negotiations.'
• (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia), Helsinki group (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia), Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro) , European CIS (Belarus, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine) , Non-European CIS (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) .
Source: own calculations based on IMF, Country Information, Transactions with the Fund, www.imf.org.
As a result the international financial institutions have been the most important actors, attempting to provide external anchoring of reforms to CIS countries. This is particularly true of the IMF which, following the debt crisis of 1982, started to place 'more emphasis on structural reforms and achievement of sustainable economic growth ' (IMF, 1987) , and which seemed to be prepared to assume the responsibility of monitoring, managing, and supporting 9 Which covers only part of the CIS region: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, potentially also Belarus. The EU also launched a mechanism of strategic partnership with Russia, similar to the ENP, which Russia does not want to be part of. See Section 5 of this paper on more discussion on ENP strengths and weaknesses. . Long-lasting and active presence in the CIS countries and some other transition countries (see figure 4) has meant that the IMF has played the most prominent role in the post-communist economic transition process of all global international organizations and its conditionality has become an important reference point in domestic policymaking (Dabrowski, 1998; Gomulka, 1995) . Figure 5 shows that, at the time of transition, the incidence of structural benchmarks in IMF supported programs indeed increased dramatically. Unfortunately, it is clear from figures 6-8 that CIS countries that were most exposed to IMF conditionality, reformed the least. Moreover, the period of peak of IMF structural conditionality in the second half of the 1990s was a period of reform stagnation and even reversal in most countries. involved in the EU accession process, we distinguish the 'Luxembourg group', 'Helsinki group' (see Section 2.1) and the Balkan countries which joined the EU integration process within the Stability Pact framework. CIS countries have all been excluded so far from the European integration process and so they were entirely dependent on international financial institutions to anchor reforms. Reflecting at least partly the heterogeneity of the group, we have split the CIS countries into European and non-European groups. In most instances, the European CIS have faced transition problems comparable to, although more intense than, other European transition economies, while for non-European CIS, these similarities are less obvious (lower level of initial development in Central Asia, oil discoveries in Caspian Sea countries, etc.). We shall analyze not only differences across countries but also in timing of reforms.
Transition countries belonging to the 'Luxembourg group' achieved relatively high standards of democratization, quality of institutions and structural reforms early in the transition process. In the following years, all countries of this group consolidated these initial gains. While the goal of going back to the West guided these countries throughout the transition process, IMF programs were discontinued early in the transition process.
For countries belonging to the 'Helsinki group', the reform progress was more uneven. The gap in democratization, institution building and structural policies temporarily increased, as some countries experienced periods of reform reversals. In particular, Slovakia experienced episodes of sharp political reversal under government of Vladimir Meciar (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) . However, the growing fear of being left aside from the EU and NATO accession for good helped Slovakia to produce one of the most spectacular political turnarounds after 1998 parliamentary election. Slovakia not only managed to catch up with the Luxembourg countries in accession negotiations, but is viewed today as the leading reformer in the region.
Latvia and Lithuania were devoted reformers, but compared to Estonia and given the level of post-Soviet distortions, the reform process was slower and less systematic. Again those countries managed to orchestrate sharp accelerations in reforms following the opening of the window of opportunity to join the EU together with the 'Luxembourg group' countries. Bulgaria, and especially Romania, proved to be rather reluctant reformers in the first years of the transition process. For those countries as well, the decisions taken in Luxembourg and Helsinki were instrumental in speeding up reforms. 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 Montenegro democratized very rapidly, however strong improvements were also characteristic of Albania and Croatia. This period also marked the acceleration of structural reform with chances for moderate gains in institutional quality. These countries cooperated with the IMF throughout the transition process; however spectacular reform gains happened only when EU accession prospects had been opened.
In summary, all countries involved in the European integration process seem to be converging to high standards of democratization and functional market economy, although the process is far from complete in the Western Balkans. Unfortunately, nothing can be less true about the direction of changes in CIS countries. This 'great divide' (Berglof and Bolton, 2002 ) might be only partly explained by less favorable initial conditions in CIS countries.
Indeed the start of reforms in these countries was relatively successful. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the European CIS countries managed to build the fundaments of democratic societies and achieved standard comparable to that of the 'Helsinki group' and higher in comparison to the Balkans. In terms of structural reforms, these countries were almost at par with the 'Helsinki group' as late as 1995. However, all CIS countries failed to consolidate these early achievements. On the contrary, standards deteriorated and started to diverge from the European standards during the second half of the 1990s. Until the 2003-2005 wave of democratic revolutions in the region, negative political tendencies characterized most CIS countries, although the reversal of democracy was strongest in Central Asia and Belarus. This was accompanied by a stagnation in institutional quality and deceleration of structural reforms. All these negative developments happened in countries in which there was a strong presence of international financial institutions, but which were unconditionally excluded from the European integration process. The EU integration has been seen by accessing countries as a civilization upgrade with understandable, realistic and highly desirable benefits. Being inside or outside the EU could determine the fate of the nation and its people in the decades to come. Therefore, incentives to meet accession criteria could not have been stronger. Moreover the criteria themselves have been largely in line with popular desire to live in democratic, free market economies, ruled by law. It has been also well understood that accessing to the EU would be a difficult process and countries in non-compliance with the Copenhagen criteria would not be admitted to the EU. As attention has been put on reform implementation and long-term progress, faking real actions through 'paper reforms' and only temporary improvements have been excluded.
Comparing EU and IMF conditionality
Characteristically, most countries involved in the European integration process managed to maintain consistent reform strategies despite unstable political environments, frequent elections and weak and short-lived coalition governments. In countries without the European anchor, political instability translated into policy inconsistency and reversals.
Although Sachs (1994) underlines that the initial widespread desire to 'return to Europe' did not automatically translate into consensus on specific policies, the EU accession conditionality with subsequent progress reports provided much of the roadmap for reform consolidation and deepening.
On the contrary, incentives to implement IMF programs in a consequent and consistent way are weak or non-existent. Some people obviously dislike the idea of cooperation with IFIs for political and ideological reasons; but, more importantly, the silent majority cannot see any obvious personal gains from its success. Russia was pretending to conduct reforms". 12 In short, it seems that the IMF, despite its recent attempts to do so through public discussions (Drazen & Isard, 2004) , can do little to provide external anchoring to reform, i.e. to promote the willingness to reform when it is not already in place.
Finally, higher effectiveness of European anchor has much to do with its unique institutional design. Opposite to membership in the UN system, Bretton Woods institutions, WTO and other similar multilateral organizations, joining the EU requires giving up a significant part of a national sovereignty in economic, political and legal spheres. The EU is a kind of confederation, having its own supranational legislative, executive and judicial organs being able to guarantee a free movement of goods, services, capital and people and enforce
11
See Dabrowski and Gortat (2002) 
International trade arrangements
Historically, centrally planned economies were isolated from international markets by state monopolies on foreign trade, lack of trade, investment and production autonomy on the enterprise level and total administrative price controls, which caused huge price and In some cases (notably Baltic countries) TAA were signed before individual countries became GATT/WTO members (see Table 2 . Although signed later and including weaker EU membership guarantees than TAA, the SAA also was far more radical in terms of removing trade and investment barriers than 13 The former Yugoslavia represented the most market-oriented trade system among the four mentioned countries. Its economic links with the rest of the communist bloc and the USSR was also the weakest -it had only 'observer' status in the CMEA. were WTO provisions. Again, the WTO accession of Balkan countries happened either contemporaneously or after the signing of the SAA. The generous trade liberalization offer of the EU led to rapid trade creation between the entire Central and Eastern Europe and the EU, on the one hand, and trade diversion vis a vis other trade partners of CEE countries, on the other (see Table 3 ). (Mogilevsky, 2004) . It seems that as long as the biggest CIS countries (Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan) stay outside the WTO, the benefits of smaller countries coming from their participation in the global trade arrangements will remain limited due to lack of regional network externalities.
Left outside global and European trade liberalization processes, CIS countries took several, mostly unsuccessful attempts to build their own regional trade block (see Table 4 ). as Belarus, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan try to maintain, at least partly, a non-market economic system), the lack of effective enforcement and arbitrage mechanism and others.
To the extent to which this 'spaghetti bowl' type of regional trade liberalization partly works, it helps very little in restructuring and modernizing CIS economies, because all partners represent the same development problems. In this respect CIS trade liberalization mechanisms cannot be considered a substitute for global or European trade and economic integration.
17
Recently joined by Uzbekistan. 
International financial stability
The former communist economies have experienced several episodes of financial instability during 1990s: high inflation/ hyperinflation in the early transition years, and a series of currency and debt crises in the second half of this decade. The latter involved several countries: Bulgaria (1996 -1997 ), Czech Republic (1997 , Russia (1994 ), Ukraine (1998 -1999 , Moldova (1998 ), Georgia (1998 , Kyrgyzstan (1996 Kyrgyzstan ( , 1998 Kyrgyzstan ( -1999 For a more detailed analysis of currency crisis episodes in transition economies and their roots and consequences -see Dabrowski et al. (2003) . 19 We do not want to neglect the important role of other organizations like the World Bank group, regional development banks, Bank of the International Settlements (BIS), OECD. However, their role is either supplementary to IMF (WB and regional development banks), or cover only certain group of countries (OECD), or their institutional mandate is very narrow (BIS -related to prudential banking regulations). Some monitoring role can be played by private institutions such as rating agencies, NGOs and research institutes but they have neither financial resources, nor enforcement mechanism to take the active policy steps. most of its republican branches (see Dabrowski, 1997) and this situation became even more dramatic after the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991. Fifteen de facto independent central banks 21 issued the same currency, which led to dangerous free riding behavior (see Sachs & Lipton, 1993 Odling-Smee and Pastor (2001) describe in detail the IMF position regarding the ruble zone, presenting a lot of internal Fund documents. They claim that the IMF was neutral with respect to two major options, i.e. continuing the ruble area vs. introducing national currencies. However, many experts (see e.g. Lipton and Sachs, 1992) considered the Fund's position as de facto supporting continuation of the ruble area.
21
At the same time most of them were politically dependent on both the legislative and executive branch of the newly formed national governments, preferring populist monetary policies. 22 We think that this kind of dilemma can be observed even more in regions other than Central and Eastern Europe and the former USSR.
historical mandate was to facilitate exchange rate stability and discourage the competitive devaluations that damage international trade.
Fifth, in many transition economies the IMF supports de facto intermediate (hybrid) monetary/ exchange rate regimes 23 , which proved to be particularly vulnerable and fragile in cases of unexpected shocks and speculative attacks (see Obstfeld & Rogoff, 1995; McCallum, 1999; Eichengreen & Hausmann, 1999; and others) 
Prospects for regional public good delivery
Before we draw conclusions about potential role of regional public goods, we should Unfortunately, formal weakening of the SGP in 2005 and the inability of several EU members to meet the EU fiscal criteria (deficit not exceeding 3% of GDP and public debt not exceeding 60% of GDP) may significantly decrease the value of this IPG (see Rostowski, 2004; Coricelli, 2005; Tanzi, 2005 . Indeed many politicians explicitly criticize treating European enlargement as a 'civilization project' and suggest concentrating attention on the interests and problems of current members.
Leaving aside the assessment whether such approach is correct or wrong one cannot be surprised by the fact that incumbent members of the 'club' may be reluctant to provide an unlimited access to its privileges to newcomers even if the latter are ready to meet all the entry criteria. This is a very nature of 'club goods', which the European integration is a typical example of. Enlargement of a 'club' involves definitely certain costs and risks to the incumbent members 29 . In the concrete case of the EU they are related, for example, to the size and structure of financial transfers, adjustment costs connected with expansion of the Single European Market, 'diluting' influence of some incumbents in a decision-making process on the EU level and making the latter more complicated and less predictable 30 , etc.
These costs might be particularly high in case of Turkey and Ukraine, which size, geopolitical location, demographic potential and institutional problems are considered as a serious challenge in some incumbent members states 31 . It means that future EU candidates will have to accept more distant and less certain 'carrot' and be subject of bigger 'stick' of potential exclusion. Whether such a less favorable balance of incentives (comparing to the 28 See the Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council, December 14/15, 2006, para. 9: "The European Council stresses the importance of ensuring that the EU can maintain and deepen its own development. The pace of enlargement must take into account the capacity of the Union to absorb new members." (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/92202.pdf) Taking into consideration a political stalemate around the Constitutional Treaty, the EU institutional reform, allowing next enlargements, may take several years.
29
Even if potential benefits both for incumbents and newcomers overweight the enlargement costs. 30 However, the analysis of the potential consequences of 2004 Enlargement for a decision-making process seems to indicate that it did not necessarily lead to increase in the EU internal heterogeneity in terms of policy preferences -see Wyplosz (2005) in respect to strategic euro-integration choices and Paczynski (2006) in respect to inflation preferences. The same question can be addressed in respect to the ENP. The lack of explicit EU membership perspective creates doubts whether ENP can provide sufficient external anchoring to domestic reform process (see Milcher & Slay, 2005) . On the other hand, one can try to imagine an attractive non-EU-membership 'carrot' for the EU neighbors in the form of enhanced security cooperation (NATO membership and/or close cooperation with the EU in the foreign and security policy spheres) in exchange for respecting European standards of human rights and democratic institutions (the first pillar of the Copenhagen criteria) and access to four basic economic freedoms in exchange for economic and institutional reforms (elements of the second and third pillar). While the early free movement of goods can be considered as an important benefit and the immediate proof of EU goodwill, the ultimate reward likely lies in the free movement of persons. Theoretically, these benefits can be delivered without actual EU membership and could become a part of the ENP or an even wider development compact.
Finding an effective non-EU-membership model of economic and political integration in Europe and in its closest neighborhood may be also important for countries, which are not interested in a full EU membership for various reasons, including Russia. This model could be based on the experience of West European countries which declined to join the EU but remain in a very close association with the EU (the European Economic Area in the case of Iceland and Norway, a system of bilateral agreements in the case of Switzerland).
This also leads us to the question on chances of repeating the EU experience in other geographical regions. At the moment the unique set of historical conditions, which led to launching the European integration project in 1950s (a desire to overcome national conflicts, in first instance a Franco-German rivalry, which led to the two world wars) and then to its subsequent expansions (willingness of less developed countries to join a club of richer neighbors, and overcome geopolitical consequences of the Cold War) seems do not exist in other regions. Although last few decades brought a lot of initiatives of economic and political integration in Asia, Arab countries, Latin America and Africa, most of them failed to deliver the expected results. The unwillingness to give up a significant part of national sovereignty in order to build effective regional institutions can be considered as the basic reason of this failure. However, one cannot exclude changes in this respect in future. Thus, learning from 32 A sharp decline of public support to EU integration in Turkey, from 73% in 2004 to 54% in 2006, while the proportion of opponents increased from 9 to 22% at the same time (see TT, chart 18, p. 19) , may signal limits of such rebalancing. the EU experience makes sense. These lessons may be also partly useful for global institutions and arrangements being responsible for delivery of global public goods.
Summary of findings
Our reading of the evidence is that the EU, through the enlargement process, acted as the regional public (club) good provider, whose influence across time and countries was correlated with better transition outcomes. In particular, the consolidation phase in democratization, institution building and structural transformation was successful in countries reforming under EU accession conditionality, but not under other forms of conditionality. In the area of trade, gains from WTO accession were dwarfed by the impact of the opening of the EU trading block for accession countries. Finally, countries participating in EU integration showed more discipline in maintaining macroeconomic stability, while IMF programs were less effective in inducing stability in the absence of the European factor 33 .
While the evidence of correlation between EU accession and the successful reform process is rather clear, it is much more difficult to prove causality. Our preferred explanation is that the EU membership perspective is so attractive politically for the candidate countries that it helps to anchor effectively the entire reform process (for similar explanation see Mizsei, 2004 and Roland, 2005) . However, other observers may argue that the membership perspective emerges as a result of progress in reforms or claim that some unobservable and fundamental factor, like geography, culture and religion can simultaneously drive both processes.
These are not mutually exclusive explanations and we suspect a virtuous circle.
Better initial conditions of some countries made future EU membership more realistic, which stimulated reforms through an external anchoring mechanism. Reforms in turn enabled subsequent stages of integration process and raised hopes of membership even more. This again stimulated reforms to complete the virtuous circle. The circle was reinforced by trade and investment integration that promoted growth, made reforms more popular and strengthened constituencies for further integration and accession, while obviously was itself conditional on progress of reforms and meeting the acquis. In our view, the incidence of these virtuous circles does not reduce the benefits of European integration prospects, on the 33 This paper does not include the analysis of two other international public goods: knowledge diffusion and adaptation and managing climate stability. However, in both policy areas the regional public goods offered by the EU (the European Research Area and the EU environmental standards) are more effective than their global equivalents.
contrary, it makes the cost of early exclusion from the process even higher in terms of reforms.
Finally, we have some direct evidence of the existence of causality from integration towards reform. In particular, the exogenous shift in the European integration strategy in Helsinki in 1999 (see Section 2.1) led to the acceleration of reforms in affected countries.
The same effect was repeated in the Western Balkan region as result of launching the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. The open threat of exclusion of Slovakia from the EU and NATO enlargement in the second half of 1990s clearly triggered the turnaround in political developments in that country. It is also noteworthy that reformist governments in CIS countries that have emerged as a result of recent democratic revolutions tend to declare EU and NATO as their strategic goals (Georgia, Ukraine). It suggests that countries actively seek the external anchoring.
In respect to promoting good governance and good policies on national level our analysis says that their long-term benefits should be considered by major domestic constituencies as realistic, understandable and widely desirable. While benefits of economic growth and poverty reduction are desirable and understandable, they might seem too distant and uncertain to strongly influence domestic reform effort. So the effective external anchoring of national reforms should involve the credible commitment on the part of developed countries and international organizations acting on their behalf to deliver attractive rewards (club benefits like external security and access to four basic economic freedoms), when the conditionality is fulfilled. To conditionality itself must be broad-based and going beyond the narrowly defined specific technical criteria (i.e., it must promote real democracy, rule of law and free market), demanding and focused on implementation, as it was in the case of the Copenhagen EU accession criteria. In other words, the offer consisting of honest conditions and irresistible rewards best summarized by the simple phrase: 'do as we do, be one of us', must be made. Such an offer is perhaps the international public good in greatest deficit today, also in the European neighborhood as momentum for further EU enlargement is currently very low and mechanisms of productive non-accession cooperation yet to be found.
